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BAR BRIEFS
(Continued from page one)
and it should be read by every member of our Association in this
State.
The outstanding accomplishment of the annual meeting at
Indianapolis was the minority report of Roscoe Pound, Dean
Emeritus of the Harvard Law School. He presented a very
strong presentation for the right of judicial review of administra-
tive proceedings.
It may be remembered that Roscoe Pound delivered an ad-
dress upon the Law of the Land at the annual meeting of our
Association held at Grand Forks on Sept. 6 and 7, 1927 at a time
when W. A. McIntyre was the President of the Bar Association.
HARRISON A. BRONSON, President.
REAL PROPERTY-JOINT TENANCY-MORTGAGE
CONSTITUTES SEVERANCE
Where land is devised to A and B as joint tenants and A
without the knowledge or consent of B gives a mortgage of his
undivided interest to C and A dies before redemption or fore-
closure, is the right of survivorship destroyed by said mortgage?
It is settled in law that a joint tenant may alienate or convey
to a stranger his portion or interest in the reality and thereby
defeat the right of survivorship, Wilken et al. v. Young, 144
Ind. 1, 41 N. E. 68 (1895). Having these rights and powers in
the land so held, there can be no sufficient reason urged why the
right of the joint tenant to mortgage the same should be denied.
The right of the joint tenant to mortgage is supported by the
following authorities: York v. Stone, 1 Selk. 158, 91 Eng. Rep. R.
146 (1709); Simpson's Lessee v. Ammons, 1 Bin. (Pa.) 175, 2
Am. Dec. 425 (1806).
If the joint tenant then has the power to mortgage his un-
divided interest what is the effect upon the joint tenancy and
survivorship? "A mortgage of a joint tenant of his share to a
stranger, would be effectual against survivorship, and may
amount to a severance of the joint estate." Washburn on Real
Property (5th Ed. 1887) Section 412. According to Corpus
Juris "The undivided interest of a joint tenant may be made the
subject of a mortgage by him without the consent or concurrence
of his cotenant, and to the extent of the mortgage lien the right
of survivors will be destroyed or suspended, and the equity of re-
demption at the death of the mortgagor tenant will be all that
will fall to his surviving cotenants." 33 C. J. 914. "The joint
tenancy is severed by the mortgage at any rate for the time
being, and until it is paid or redeemd." 2 Thompson on Real Pro-
perty (1st. ed. 1924) Section 1716.
The authority for the above rules of law is found in four
cases, York v. Stone, supra; Simpson's Lessee v. Ammons, supra;
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In re Pollard's Estate, 3 De G. & Sm. 541, 46 Eng. Rep. R 746
(1863), and Wilken et al. v. Young, supra. Of these four cases
the first three were decided in title theory jurisdictions. The
latter of the four cases cited is the only instance where the issue
was determined in a lien theory jurisdiction. The author has
little doubt but that at common law a mortgage constituted a
severance. With title passing, such a transaction would be
analagous to a conveyance, and would doubtless constitute a sev-
erance thus defeating the survivorship doctrine. But in a lien
theory jurisdiction where title is not transferred to the mortgagee,
but remains in the mortgagor with the mortgagee holding only a
lien, it is a more serious problem to spell out a severance of the
joint tenancy. Wilken v. Young, supra, is the one case holding
that in a lien theory state a mortgage constitutes a severance, and
the court made no attempt to solve this problem. Tiffany, in his
work on Real Property, (Vol. 1, 2d. Ed. 1920) Section 191 states
that the Wilken Case does not appear to accord with the common
law authorities to the effect, that the creation by a joint tenant
of a mere charge upon the land, or the grant of a mere incorporeal
thing, a privilege such as a right of profit, to be exercised upon
the land, is a nullity as against the right of the other joint tenant
as survivor.
If the rule as laid down in the Wilken Case is to be taken
with a liberal interpretation one can then state with authority
that a lien will constitute a severance of the joint tenancy thus
defeating the doctrine of survivorship. Surely the lien of a
judgment creditor would not create a severance. Before a judg-
ment lien will operate as a severance there must be a levy and
sale. 2 Thompson, Real Property, (1st. Ed. 1924) Section 1717.
The Wilken Case is the result of the application of the common
law rule to litigation in a state which has adopted the lien theory
of mortgages. The reason for the rule no longer exists in lien
theory states, since title is not transferred by a mortgage, but in
the face of this the Indiana court applied the common law rule.
Such is the result where stress is laid on the historical back-
ground rather than the reason and philosophy behind the rule.
With the lien statute the reason for the common law rule was
eliminated, but regardless of the reason behind the common law
rule the Indiana court followed it.
With there being but one case litigated on this issue, and
that being the Wilken case, it would appear that in North Dakota
a like result would occur. Thus as to property mortgaged by A
the right of survivorship is destroyed and the equity of redemp-
tion at the death of the mortgagor will be all that will fall to his
cotenant. Although under the rules of joint tenancy one cannot
properly make a blanket statement that a lien operates as a
severance, under the present cases the lien created by .a mortgage
will have to be recognized as a severance.
WILMER D. NEWTON,
Law Student
University of North Dakota
